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Abstract 
Time judgement and time experience are distinct elements of time perception. It is 
known that time experience tends to be slow, or dilated, when depressed, but there is 
less certainty or clarity concerning how depression affects time judgement. Here, we 
use a Bayesian Prediction Error Minimisation (PEM) framework called ‘distrusting 
the present’ as an explanatory and predictive model of both aspects of time 
perception. An interval production task was designed to probe and modulate the 
relationship between time perception and depression. Results showed that 
hopelessness, a symptom of severe depression, was associated with the ordering of 
interval lengths, reduced overall error, and dilated time experience. We propose that 
‘distrusting the future’ is accompanied by ‘trusting the present’, leading to the 
experiences of time dilation when depressed or hopeless. Evidence was also found to 
support a relative difference model of how hopelessness dilates, and arousal 
accelerates, the rate of experienced time.     
 
Keywords: time perception, time experience, Bayesian inference, prediction error 
minimisation, hopelessness, relativity, autonomic arousal 
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Bayes, Time Perception, and Relativity: The Central Role of Hopelessness 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Many factors can cause the subjective experience of time to speed up (accelerate) or 
slow down (dilate). Long empty intervals are associated with dilated time experience 
(Droit-Volet et al., 2017), as are delayed stimulus onset (Loftus, Schooler, Boone, & 
Kline, 1987; Osuna, 1985) and sub-optimal processing loads associated with boredom 
(Zakay, 2014). Thönes and Oberfeld’s (2015) meta-analysis showed that depressed 
people tend to experience time dilation. However, and perhaps in a manner similar to 
boredom, Tipples (2018) found that time dilation is predicted by feelings of 
frustration more than it is by feelings of sadness.   
At the opposite extreme, the experience of time is accelerated in situations 
where cognitive processing is optimal and perceived delays are minimal (i.e., the 
opposite of boredom) in what is commonly called a ‘flow state’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 
1975). Similarly, people in a manic state of hyperarousal also tend to experience time 
as accelerated (Bschor et al., 2004; Mezey & Knight, 1965; Moskalewicz & 
Schwartz, 2018). Many studies and theoretical models have demonstrated that arousal 
is a key accelerant of time experience (Gil & Droit-Volet, 2012), but attention to time 
is also a critical factor (Burle & Casini, 2001; Glicksohn, 2001).  
According to the most longstanding and widely cited models of time 
perception, commonly referred to as the ‘internal clock’, timing begins with a ‘clock’ 
stage that is itself broken into discrete stages relating to arousal and attention 
(Treisman, 1963). Arousal is theoretically related to the ‘pacemaker’ which sets the 
tempo of the clock, whereas attention is related to the ‘switch’ or ‘gate’ that sends 
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timing signals to an ‘accumulator’ (Allman, Teki, Griffiths, & Meck, 2014; Burle & 
Casini, 2001). More specifically, arousal speeds up the internal pacemaker (Gil & 
Droit-Volet, 2012; Zakay & Block, 1997) and attention to time directs temporal 
information to the accumulator (Zakay & Block, 1995; Zakay & Block, 1996). 
Timing judgements are then made on the basis of this temporal information stored in 
the accumulator.  
According to Glicksohn’s (2001) interpretation, higher levels of arousal and/or 
attention focused on the task leads to the rapid accumulation of small units of time 
(i.e., acceleration), whereas lower levels of arousal and/or more attention paid to time 
leads to the slower accumulation of larger time units (i.e., dilation). An example of 
this distinction is that, although in a low arousal state which might otherwise lead to a 
slow accumulation/passage of time, mindfulness meditators can be so immersed in the 
mindfulness task that they pay virtually no attention to time and so time experience is 
accelerated (Droit-Volet, Chaulet, & Dambrun, 2018). 
When engaging such models of time perception in the context of depression, it 
is important to stress the distinction between time experience and time judgement. A 
recent meta-analysis by Thönes and Oberfeld (2015) showed that depressed patients 
tend to report their experience of time as slowed. As noted by Thönes and Oberfeld 
(2015), time experience is typically measured using a visual analogue scale (VAS) 
from ‘very fast’ to ‘very slow’ where, unlike time judgement tasks, “the concept of 
interval duration does not apply” (p. 364). This is in contrast to time judgement tasks 
which must occur over an interval (or range of intervals) of a given duration (Droit-
Volet & Wearden, 2016). To reinforce this distinction, the same meta-analytic study 
showed that depressed patients’ performance on time judgements tasks is not 
uniformly slow, late or under/over-estimated compared to controls (Thönes & 
Running head: HOPELESSNESS, TIME PERCEPTION AND RELATIVITY 
5 
Oberfeld, 2015). The situation is thus more complex for time judgement than for time 
experience in depression and requires further study.  
The divergence between findings of time experience and time judgement in 
depression may stem from the fact that previous approaches mainly deal with early 
‘clock’ stages of information processing. A comprehensive model of time judgement 
must also include ‘memory’ and ‘decision’ stages. One of the main aims of the 
present paper is to explain the apparent mismatch in depression between time 
experience and time judgement in terms of a Bayesian model of time perception, 
focused on the notion of ‘distrusting the present’ (Hohwy, Paton, & Palmer, 2016). 
This model proposes that perceived time speeds up or slows down depending on how 
inferences are made on the basis of memory and sensory data.   
 
1.1 Prediction Error Minimisation and Time Perception: ‘Distrusting the Present’ 
 
Bayesian Prediction Error Minimisation treats the brain as a sophisticated 
hypothesis-testing machine that attempts to make accurate predictions (of the future) 
based on limited information available in (present) sensation and (past) memory 
(Clark, 2015; Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2013). Bayesian statistics operationalise these 
concepts by describing how the brain seeks to minimise error (i.e., the value of the 
loss function) of predictive inference (i.e., the posterior distribution) by selectively 
weighting probabilities based on prior experience (i.e., the prior distribution) and 
present sensory data (i.e., the sensory likelihood distribution) (Mathys et al., 2014; 
Palmer, Lawson, & Hohwy, 2017). Shi, Church, and Meck (2013) mapped these 
distributions onto information processing stages of interval timing as per the dominant 
internal clock model above: 1) the sensory likelihood distribution equates to the 
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‘clock’ stage that modulates tempo and duration via a pacemaker, switch, and 
accumulator; 2) the posterior and prior distributions equate to the working and 
reference memory aspects of the ‘memory’ stage; and 3) the loss function equates to 
the ‘decision’ stage. Kent (2018) has also mapped these functions onto the three 
major brain networks (i.e., salience, default mode, and central executive). 
The ‘decision’ stage of interval timing reflects the core Bayesian function of 
making predictive inferences to determine the causes of sensory input. Hohwy et al. 
(2016) developed a PEM account of time experience focused on the notion of 
distrusting the present where the rate of flow of experienced time varies depending on 
how quickly a (Bayesian) observer ‘decides’ that the present predictive inference (h0) 
is less trustworthy than the next inference (h1), where trust is operationalised as the 
relative precision of h0 and h1. The more quickly one becomes certain (i.e., decides) 
that h0 has optimally predicted present sensory data, the more quickly h1 is required to 
explain incoming sensory data. More rapid passage through successive inferences 
leads to more rapid passage of time.  
So, in order to endorse h1 over h0, and thus experience temporal flow, 
expectations about the predictability or reliability of the future are acutely relevant. 
Each decision must be made by weighting the limited ability to infer present causes 
against the likely ability to predict future causes. To connect this account to time 
perception in depression, we accordingly reason here that hope for the future is 
critical within a PEM framework requiring people to ‘distrust the present’ because, in 
doing so, they must simultaneously ‘trust the future’ in a hopeful way. Hopefulness 
represents a degree of certainty about future PEM, a tendency to endorse h1, and an 
accelerated experience of time.  
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1.2 Prediction Error Minimisation of Time Perception in Depression: ‘Distrusting 
the Future’ 
 
Given the Bayesian approach, hopelessness (i.e., ‘distrusting the future’) 
should be correlated with a tendency to ‘trust’ h0 over h1, and thus experience time 
more slowly. Hopelessness is one of the major symptoms of depression, especially 
severe depression, and is closely related to future time perspective (Beck, Weissman, 
Lester, & Trexler, 1974). If there is a common basis for time dilation experienced 
during long empty intervals (Droit-Volet et al, 2017), boredom (Zakay, 2014), 
frustration (Tipples, 2018), and depression (Thönes & Oberfeld, 2015), such that they 
are all due to increased attention paid to time (Glicksohn, 2001), then it is possible 
that long, empty intervals that induce boredom may also cue a state of hopelessness. 
A longer second interval compared to the first, for example, could prompt people to 
feel they are ‘waiting’ a relatively long time for the second interval to end and so feel 
somewhat bored or frustrated. This effect could enhance attention paid to time 
(Glicksohn, 2001), have a deleterious effect on the decision stage of information 
processing (Shi et al., 2013), slow time experience (Droit-Volet et al., 2017), and 
increase perceived hopelessness. 
It is proposed that the precise mechanism for cuing hopelessness stems from 
‘temporal uncertainty’. Uncertainty in the sensory environment inhibits the ability to 
make accurate predictions and, in terms of Bayesian time judgement, Jazayeri and 
Shadlen (2010) showed that relatively long intervals are intrinsically more uncertain 
than shorter intervals due to scalar variability. According to ‘distrusting the present’, 
and in accordance with recent findings (Droit-Volet et al., 2017), uncertainty during 
longer intervals could slow down the passage of experienced time and increase 
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hopelessness. Here, ‘distrusting the future’ (h1) slows the process of ‘distrusting the 
present’ (h0) (Hohwy et al., 2016). 
 
1.3 Modelling and Assessing ‘Distrusting the Present’ 
 
A predictive model of ‘distrusting the present’ is required to test the theory. So 
far, none have been proposed and so a predictive model can only be speculated on 
reasonable prima facie grounds. Any model must capture two complementary aspects: 
1) the more h0 is “trusted”, the slower time is experienced; and 2) the more h1 is 
“trusted”, the more quickly time is experienced. There is, therefore, a tension between 
h0 and h1 that, at a fundamental level, can either be expressed in terms of absolute (h0 
minus h1) or relative (a ratio of h0 to h1) difference. Glicksohn (2001) postulated a 
multiplicative model of apparent duration for two complementary aspects (size and 
number of time units), and so the inverse of multiplication (i.e., division or ratio) is 
perhaps more likely than the inverse of an additive function (i.e., subtraction).  
Further reasons also suggest a relative difference model of time experience 
may be preferable to absolute difference. According to Glicksohn’s (2001) 
multiplicative model, psychological time has two polar limits: 1) accelerated 
timelessness associated with hyperarousal and/or highly-focussed attention where 
time units are so small and/or accumulate so quickly that they can no longer be 
perceived (as in a mindfulness/flow state or mania); and 2) dilation timelessness 
associated with hyper-attention to time and/or ultra-low arousal where time units 
become so large and/or accumulate so slowly that time no longer ‘passes’ (as in 
boredom or depression). These opposing poles then reflect a universal property of 
time. It is interesting to observe that in physics, relativity theory proposes two 
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analogous temporal limits: 1) accelerated timelessness associated with massless 
particles (i.e., photons) where time and space are contracted to a point due to the 
particle moving at the speed of light; and 2) dilated timelessness associated with 
supermassive bodies (i.e., black holes) where time and space are infinitely expanded 
due to the warping effect of gravity (Einstein, 1920; Misner, Thorne, & Wheeler, 
1973). 
Given the lack of clear precedent in the literature to model ‘distrusting the 
present’,	we believe it is reasonable to appeal to properties of physical time and thus 
model psychological time by relativity and relative difference. Although aspects of 
psychological and physical accounts of time thus coincide in principle, the relativistic 
properties of physical time might initially seem irrelevant to psychological time. 
However, Buhusi and Meck (2009) have shown that a meaningful analogy can be 
drawn between relativity theory and time judgement. Their explanation analogises the 
‘special’ theory of relativity and hinges on the concurrent timing of multiple ‘internal 
clocks’. Their analogy cannot apply to ‘distrusting the present’ because, as explained 
above, time experience is not defined according to clock-based interval durations. 
Instead the ‘general’ theory of relativity, which describes time dilation under gravity, 
may be more fit for the current purpose (Einstein, 1920). To illustrate, time dilation 
due to gravity can be calculated according to a relative difference equation in a 
simplified form of the Schwarzschild metric (Schwarzschild, 1916), below: 
 
   !"#$	&"'()"*+	 ≈ 	-1 − 012234251678     (1) 
 
The two variables, mass and distance (or gravitational potential energy) 
represent the two physical temporal limits described above. From the equation it 
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follows that: 1) infinite time dilation occurs (i.e., time stops) when mass (which can 
itself be measured as a distance, the Schwarzschild radius of a black hole, rs) equals 
or exceeds the distance to that mass (i.e., the square-root of 0 is undefined); and 2) 
infinite time acceleration occurs (i.e., time passes imperceptibly fast) when mass is 
zero or distance/energy is infinite, as in the case of a massless photon.  
As above, these are analogous to the two temporal limits described by 
Glicksohn (2001) and can be substituted as: 
 
 !"#$	&"'()"*+	 ≈ 	-1 − 2498	:;	5408	<64526<0=8>	:;	5408	<6452    (2) 
 
Given no standard units are available to measure ‘size’ or ‘number’ in 
Equation 2, proxy measures proposed by Glicksohn (2001) are used instead: 
 
 !"#$	&"'()"*+	 ≈ 	-1 − 1558654:6	5:	54081>:<21?      (3) 
 
In terms of ‘distrusting the present’ and the current experimental design, 
where attention to time is operationalised as hopelessness, the equation takes the 
form: 
 
  !"#$	&"'()"*+	 ≈ 	-1 − @:A8?82268221>:<21?     (4) 
 
These proxy measures are therefore taken to represent the degree to which 
weighting is given to either h0 via hopelessness or h1 via arousal.  
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  !"#$	&"'()"*+ ≈	-1 − @B@C    (5) 
 
An added advantage of preferring the relative difference equation is that 
relative difference is also a feature of a Bayesian loss function which Shi et al. (2013) 
associated with the ‘decision’ stage of interval timing: 
 
  DEE*E = G1 − H25401583	4658>I1?J1>K85	4658>I1? LM	    (6) 
 
 This relative squared-error loss function (involving a ratio in Equation 6) is 
preferable to absolute squared-error (i.e., target interval minus the estimated interval, 
squared) because the amount of error is scale or interval invariant (Sun, Wang, Goyal, 
& Varshney, 2012). This means that error in the estimate is effectively a (relative) 
proportion of the target interval in question. Scale invariance, in turn, allows Bayesian 
accounts of time perception to accord with preceding models related to scalar 
expectancy theory (Gibbon, 1977; Shi, Church, & Meck, 2013).  
A critical feature of PEM and ‘distrusting the present’ is that error 
minimisation, given its association with the ‘decision’ stage of timing and the loss 
function, can be quantified in relation to this relative squared-error on a series of time 
judgement tasks. This suggests that the ‘decision’ stage of internal timing is optimised 
so that a lower overall error is achieved at the expense of error in any one particular 
judgement. A common way this is achieved in time perception is through the central 
tendency effect (Treisman, 1963), whereby individuals bias judgements towards the 
(moving) average of intervals presented. In a Bayesian context, this averaging is done 
in order to deal with uncertainty in a noisy or volatile sensory environment (Jazayeri 
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& Shadlen, 2010; Karaminis et al., 2016). In time judgement tasks, this central 
tendency leads to a so-called Vierordt effect such that shorter intervals are judged as 
‘longer’ than they really are, and longer intervals are judged as ‘shorter’ than they 
really are (Lejeune & Wearden, 2009). It is expected that increased hopelessness, in a 
manner similar to a depressive realism effect (Kornbrot, Msetfi, & Grimwood, 2013; 
Moore & Fresco, 2012) and enhanced error detection in depression (Chiu & Deldin, 
2007), should be associated with low overall error on an time judgement task (i.e., 
judgements by those higher in hopelessness should be closer to veridical on average 
compared to those lower in hopelessness).  
Although there are a multitude of ways to assess time judgement, and different 
methods produce seemingly contradictory results, here we focused exclusively on 
interval production tasks. We have done so because they are particularly sensitive to 
whether attention is being paid to time or some other concurrent task (Zakay & Shub, 
1998). Production methods require individuals to manually judge duration by 
indicating the start and/or end of a target interval, which is different to verbally 
estimating an interval (i.e., passively judging interval length in seconds or minutes), 
or even reproducing an interval that has been presented previously. 
 
1.4 Aims and Hypotheses 
 
There are separate literatures showing that symptoms of anxiety (i.e., arousal) 
speed up, while symptoms of depression (i.e., hopelessness) slow down, the rate of 
perceived time (Gil & Droit-Volet, 2012; Thönes & Oberfeld, 2015). They have not 
been viewed in tandem and we believe the literature will be extended by 
simultaneously accounting for factors that dilate and contract perceived time. An 
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experiment involving a time production task and self-reported time experience was set 
up to test the above Bayesian PEM model of time perception (i.e., both experience 
and judgement) in relation to hopelessness and arousal. Based on previous research, it 
was expected that: (a) hopelessness would correlate with reduced relative squared-
error of interval production; (b) hopelessness would be associated with longer second 
than first intervals; (c) hopelessness would be associated with slow time experience, 
while autonomic arousal would be associated with fast time experience; and (d) a 
proxy model of a square-rooted relative difference equation involving hopelessness 
and arousal, as above, would explain more variance in time experience than an 
absolute difference between hopelessness and arousal.  
 
2. Method 
 
2.1 Participants 
 
The sample comprised 64 people (38 females) ranging from 17 to 55 years of 
age (M = 35.00 years, SD = 6.94). Missing data were replaced using multiple 
imputation for two participants’ time production data, two participants’ breathing rate 
data, and six participants’ hopelessness scores. 
Participants were screened for depression symptoms (Patient Health 
Questionnaire 9-item, PHQ-9), anxiety symptoms (Generalised Anxiety Disorder 7-
item, GAD-7), insomnia (Insomnia Severity Index, ISI), alcohol and illicit drug use 
(Cut-down, Annoyed, Guilty, and Eye-opener Alcohol Illicit Drug, CAGE-AID), and 
cognitive processing speed (Trail Making Test, Part A). According to pre-test 
psychometric screening tools, none of the participants experienced severe anxiety 
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(GAD-7 max = 13, M = 2.83, SD = 2.75), depression (PHQ-9 max = 16, M = 3.19, SD 
= 3.15), insomnia (ISI max = 13, M = 3.94, SD = 3.46), or slow cognitive processing 
(Trail Making Test A max = 35 s, M = 21.91 s, SD = 4.76 s) (Bastien, Vallières, & 
Morin, 2001; Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001; Reitan, 1958; Spitzer, Kroenke, 
Williams, & Löwe, 2006). Heart rate variability (HRV) 25/50/75 interquartile 
statistics were all within normal ranges (SDNN = 34/58/75, LF:HF = 1.2/1.8/2.2) 
(Shaffer & Ginsberg, 2017). No outliers were removed. 
 
2.2 Materials 
 
In order to allow for later comparison with clinical samples, several clinical 
screening tests were used on the current sample of healthy volunteers. The ISI 
assesses sleep disturbance across seven items (e.g., “How WORRIED/DISTRESSED 
are you about your current sleep problem?”) on five-point Likert scale (Bastien, 
Vallières, & Morin, 2001). The Trail Making Test Part A assesses cognitive 
processing speed by asking participants to link a spatially distributed series of 
numbers as quickly as possible while making as few errors as possible (Reitan, 1958). 
The CAGE-AID screens for problematic alcohol and illicit drug use with four yes/no 
items relating to different aspects of dependence and misuse (Bush, Shaw, Cleary, 
Delbanco, & Aronson, 1987). The PHQ-9 and GAD-7 screen for depression and 
anxiety symptoms, respectively, over the previous two-week period (i.e., “Over the 
past two weeks, how often have you been bothered by the following problems?”) 
asking people to report the frequency of certain behaviours or experiences (e.g., 
“Little interest or pleasure in doing things” or “Feeling anxious, nervous or on edge”). 
Both scales are rated on four-point Likert scales of frequency (i.e., “Not at all”, 
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“Several days”, “More than half the days”, and “Nearly every day”; Kroenke, Spitzer, 
& Williams, 2001; Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams, & Löwe, 2006). The 20-item Beck 
Hopelessness Scale (BHS) assesses levels of hopelessness over the preceding week 
(i.e., states) using true/false responses to items relating to feelings about the future, 
loss of motivation, and expectations (Beck et al., 1974).  
 
2.3 Procedure 
 
In line with Human Research Ethics Committee clearance (A15-105) from 
Federation University, participants read a plain language statement and provided 
written consent prior to participation. No reimbursement was offered for participation. 
Exclusion criteria included insomnia, drug or alcohol dependence, impaired cognitive 
processing speed, and visual impairment. One participant was excluded on this basis. 
Electronic materials were displayed on a 21” Apple iMac (2011) or 13” MacBook Pro 
(2013) via an internet browser (Safari, Chrome, or Firefox). Participation took place 
in a quiet, distraction-free environment between 9am and 9pm. Participation took 
between 30 and 45 mins in total. 
In order to measure aspects of autonomic arousal, participants’ HRV indices 
were measured first. Heart rate variability data were collected from participants using 
a Polar H7 heartrate monitor and “HRV logger” iOS application on an iPhone 5s. 
Participants laid supine in a quiet room for 10 mins and were instructed to breathe 
normally, minimise movement, and to not talk. Demographics were then collected 
and screening tests performed. Time perception measures were then administered, and 
participants completed their involvement by filling out an online version of the BHS.  
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In the time perception tasks, participants first indicated how quickly or slowly 
they had experienced time on the day of the experiment on a 100 mm VAS displaying 
“very slow” at the bottom and “very fast” at the top. Averaging time experience over 
long timeframes is typical when probing the relationship to depression (Bschor et al., 
2004; Mundt, Richter, van Hees, & Stumpf, 1998; Oberfeld, Thönes, Palayoor, & 
Hecht, 2014) and the basis for comparison in the Thönes and Oberfeld (2015) meta-
analysis. Participants were then instructed to produce six randomised intervals (i.e., 
10, 20, 30, 40, 60 and 90 s) by clicking “start” and “stop” icons on their screen. 
Participants were advised that counting was allowed. In order to ensure that the first 
interval production was not biased by any previous intervals (see Lejuene & Wearden, 
2009), no practice intervals were offered.  
Much of the experiment was modelled on Bschor et al. (2004) who used a 
VAS of participants’ experience of time on the day of the experiment, and allowed 
participants to count in time estimation/reproduction/production tasks. Bschor et al. 
(2004) showed that depressed and manic individuals had opposite time experience 
(i.e., depressed = slow, manic = fast) and, for reasons addressed in the Introduction, a 
replication of this finding was sought in relation to autonomic/anxious arousal and 
hopelessness. Bschor et al. (2004) also used productions intervals over a similar range 
(7 – 90 s). Such ranges are common when investigating effects of depression using 
production tasks (Thönes & Oberfeld, 2015) and were required here to cue feelings of 
boredom. As shown by Danckert and Allman (2005), error associated with boredom 
proneness only becomes salient for intervals around 60 s duration, while Droit-Volet 
et al. (2017) showed that slowed time experience only becomes salient for intervals 
great than 33 s. Other studies using production intervals have also employed intervals 
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beyond 10 s (Baldauf et al., 2009) and as high as 90 s (Labelle, Graf, Grondin, & 
Gagne-Roy, 2009). 
 
2.4 Statistical analyses 
 
2.4.1 Anxious and autonomic arousal. 
As above, a proxy measure of the endorsement of h1 was sought as an index of 
anxious and/or autonomic arousal. In line with previous research (Beard & 
Björgvinsson, 2014; Kertz, Bigda-Peyton, & Bjorgvinsson, 2013), a subscale of the 
GAD-7 questionnaire relating to anxious arousal was calculated by summing items 4-
6 only. For autonomic arousal, several HRV statistics are reportable from the “HRV 
logger” iOS software, including average heartrate and a spectral power analysis in the 
high frequency (HF; 0.15-0.40 Hz) and low frequency (LF; 0.04-0.15 Hz) bands. The 
HRV logger also provides a ratio of the latter power bands (LF:HF) which, while an 
unreliable indicator or sympatho-vagal balance in the autonomic nervous system 
(Billman, 2013), has been correlated with spontaneous breathing rate in controlled 
conditions (Brown, Beightol, Koh, & Eckberg, 1993; Raghuraj, Ramakrishnan, 
Nagendra, & Telles, 1998; Saboul, Pialoux, & Hautier, 2014). Breathing rate and the 
arousal subscale of the GAD-7 were interpreted to represent anxious and autonomic 
facets of arousal. 
 
2.4.2 Absolute and relative difference models of time experience.  
As above, the relative difference model of time experience was calculated by 
standardising and transforming hopelessness and autonomic/anxious arousal scores. 
The absolute difference model simply subtracted the standardised and transformed 
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hopelessness score from the standardised and transformed autonomic arousal score. 
The two models treat relative values of hopelessness and arousal differently. For 
example, when the arousal value is 1.618 and the hopelessness value is 1, then the 
absolute and relative difference models give the same answer (i.e., .618) and predict 
the same rate of time experience. However, if the hopelessness value is 1 and arousal 
value is less than 1.618, then the relative difference model calculates faster time 
experience (i.e., 0.58) than the absolute difference model (i.e., 0.50). On the other 
hand, for arousal values greater than 1.618 compared to a hopelessness value of 1, the 
relative difference model predicts slower time experience (i.e., 0.64) than the absolute 
difference model (i.e., 0.70). As shown in Figure 1 the relative difference function is 
curved and time experience decelerates more quickly as hopelessness increases 
compared to the absolute difference model. This is true regardless of the absolute 
level of arousal or hopelessness, as shown between Figure 1a and 1b, and it is only 
the point of equivalence that changes for different absolute values. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of different predictions of time experience (y axis) by absolute 
and relative difference models depending on the ratio of arousal (x axis) to 
hopelessness (A = 1, B = 2).  
 
2.4.3 Bayesian and frequentist statistics. 
Zero-order and partial Pearson correlations were used to demonstrate 
associations between variables such as hopelessness, time experience, relative squared 
error and autonomic arousal. The statistical control of the length of the first 
interval/production (i.e., inclusion as a predictor) is required due to our expectation 
that longer second intervals would cue boredom-like effects and subsequently affect 
hopelessness. Results regarding the relation of hopelessness to the relative length of 
the first and second intervals supported this statistical control. 
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In order to compare the relative difference and absolute difference models in a 
small sample with small-to-medium expected effect sizes (Thönes & Oberfeld, 2016), 
Bayes Factor multiple regression analysis was better suited to the current study. As 
opposed to a confidence or significance level regarding the alternate hypothesis, 
Bayes Factors weigh evidence for different models by quantifying how much more 
likely one particular model is compared to others, including the null hypothesis 
(Dienes, 2011; Van Doorn, Paton, Howell, & Hohwy, 2015). A Bayes Factor of BF10 
= 10, for example, indicates that the model under consideration is ten times more 
likely than the null. Using a system devised by Jeffreys (1998), BF10 > 10 is 
interpreted as strong evidence for the model in question, and BF10 > 100 is interpreted 
as decisive evidence. Standard frequentist linear regressions were then computed to 
determine the strength and direction of effects in models supported by Bayes Factors. 
Frequentist statistics were calculated using SPSS (version 25) and Bayesian statistics 
were calculated using JASP (version 0.8.6).  
 
3. Results 
 
3.1 Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations 
Descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that, despite large ranges, interval 
productions were highly linear (R2, M = .98, SD = .01). Error, time experience, 
breathing rate, anxious arousal and hopelessness were also within acceptable ranges. 
Bivariate correlations in Table 2 were consistent with predictions in showing 
significant correlations between models of time experience (calculated from arousal 
and hopelessness scores) and reported time experience, as well as hopelessness and 
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relative-squared error across all six intervals (r = -.34, p = .005). The correlation 
between hopelessness and error confirmed the hypothesis (a), above. 
 
Table 1. Ranges, means and standard deviations of time productions, linearity, 
relative-squared error, time experience, arousal and hopelessness. 
Variable Min. Max. M SD 
10 s production (s) 5 22 11.24 3.25 
20 s production (s) 10 68 23.15 9.01 
30 s production (s) 20 81 34.97 11.46 
40 s production (s) 21 103 47.73 15.15 
60 s production (s) 37 144 73.11 21.76 
90 s production (s) 58 207 110.84 31.75 
Linearity (R2) 0.92 1 0.98 0.02 
Relative-squared error 0.01 3.05 0.45 0.57 
Time experience (VAS 0 - 1000) 248 949 644.97 180.32 
Breathing rate (LF:HF) .40 3.37 1.71 .63 
Anxious arousal 0 6.00 1.25 1.35 
Arousal (standardised) -1.78 3.42 0.00 1.00 
Hopelessness (BHS raw score) 0 8 2.26 1.75 
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Table 2. Bivariate correlations between variables associated with time experience, time judgement, hopelessness and arousal.  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Dilation - -.08 -.06 -.20 .39** .40** -.10 .31* 
2. Length of first production  - -.78** -.27* .36** .30* .19 .19 
3. Longer second interval than first   - .32** -.40** -.37** .01 -.18 
4. Hopelessness    - -.78** -.71** -.34** .15 
5. Relative Difference Model     - .93** .32** .44** 
6. Absolute Difference Model      - .32** .54** 
7. Relative-square error       - .04 
8. Arousal        - 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
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3.2 Hopelessness and Longer Second Intervals 
Hopelessness was also correlated with random allocation to a longer second 
than first production interval (r = .32, p = .008), but not to subsequent interval 
differences (p’s > .05). This confirmed hypothesis (b), above. It is also therefore 
necessary to control for the length of the first interval in subsequent analyses 
involving hopelessness. When controlling for the length of the first interval, a partial 
correlation between hopelessness and relative squared error remains significant, and 
of the same magnitude (r = -.34, p = .005). This reactive increase in hopelessness was 
also associated with a Vierordt central tendency effect that biased responses to a 
moving average of intervals presented (Shi et al., 2013) (see Appendix A for full 
discussion). Overall, the hypothesised associations between hopelessness, lengthening 
between first and second intervals, and low error were confirmed. 
 
3.3 Hopelessness, Autonomic Arousal, and Time Experience 
The hypothesised relationship between hopelessness, arousal, and time 
experience also needed to correct for the length of the first interval production. When 
controlling for arousal and the first interval production, hopelessness was negatively 
correlated with time experience (r = -.33, p = .008), confirming that hopelessness is 
associated with dilated time experience. Conversely, when controlling for 
hopelessness and the first interval production, autonomic arousal was positively 
correlated with time experience (r = .40, p = .001), confirming that arousal is 
associated with accelerated time experience. These results confirm hypothesis (c), 
above. 
Running head: HOPELESSNESS, TIME PERCEPTION AND RELATIVITY 
24 
 
3.4 Relative Versus Absolute Difference Models of ‘Distrusting the Present’ 
It was hypothesised that the relative difference equation would effectively 
model the combined effects of hopelessness and autonomic arousal on time 
experience. To test the prediction, a relative difference model of normalised and 
transformed hopelessness and arousal variables (i.e., anxious arousal and breathing 
rate) was compared to an absolute difference model (i.e., arousal minus hopelessness).  
When controlling for the first interval production, Bayesian linear regression 
showed more evidence in support of the relative difference model (BF10 = 62.25, R2 = 
.21) than the absolute difference model (BF10 = 54.30, R2 = .21) in predicting time 
experience. Frequentist regression showed that the relative difference model predicted 
time experience (β = .49, p < .001) in conjunction with the first interval production (β 
= -.26, p = .03), R2 = .21, F(2, 64) = 8.62, p < .001. Assumptions of homoscedasticity 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests, p > .05) and multicollinearity (VIFs < 
2) were not violated. These results confirm hypothesis (d) above by showing that the 
relative difference equation performs well as a calculus of time experience from 
proxy measures of h0 and h1 endorsement such as hopelessness and arousal, 
respectively. Results are summarised in Figure 2, below. 
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Figure 2. Hypothesised bivariate and partial (controlling for length of first interval 
production and arousal, italics and in brackets) correlations between hopelessness, 
arousal, time experience, interval ordering, relative squared error, and the relative 
difference model of time experience. *p < .05, **p < .01 
 
4. Discussion 
Results confirmed hypothesised associations between: (a) hopelessness and low 
production (relative squared) error; (b) hopelessness and lengthening between first 
and second production intervals; (c) hopelessness with dilated, and autonomic arousal 
with accelerated, time experience; and (d) a relative difference equation of 
hopelessness and autonomic arousal as a proxy model for Hohwy et al.’s (2016) 
‘distrusting the present’ Bayesian PEM framework of time experience. Just as arousal 
has been found to accelerate the ‘clock’ stage of interval timing and emotional time 
distortions (Gil & Droit-Volet, 2012; Glicksohn, 2001), hopelessness may affect the 
‘decision’ stage of interval timing and cause cognitive time distortions such as the 
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Vierordt effect described in Appendix A. This experiment successfully exploited the 
relationship between relatively long intervals, temporal uncertainty, dilated time 
experience, and depressive symptomatology to demonstrate a dynamic relationship 
explicable within the ‘distrusting the present’ framework.  
Randomised lengthening between intervals one and two may cause individuals 
to experience time dilation just as waiting for longer than expected causes boredom 
and slowed time experience (Loftus, Schooler, Boone, & Kline, 1987; Osuna, 1985). 
According to Zakay (2014), slowed time experience in response to boredom is a 
“signal which, similarly to pain, is aimed at alerting the executive system that 
resources should be recruited in order to cope with the hazardous state” (p. 1). In this 
sense, the implication for the current study is that the increased hopelessness found in 
response to lengthening between the first and second intervals is an index of that 
signal. This process is therefore thought to underpin the same phenomenon observed 
in severe depressive states (Thönes & Oberfeld, 2015), both in terms of dilated time 
experience and Vierordt-like effects of time production.  
By focussing on hopelessness and showing the complex relationship between 
depressive symptoms and time experience, the present study provides some 
explanation as to why time dilation effects of depression do not, as found by Thönes 
and Oberfeld (2015), translate into uniformly slow judgements. In order to reduce 
uncertainty and overall error, a hopeless/depressed mindset may recruit a strategy of 
central tendency that lengthens the judgement of shorter intervals and shortens the 
judgement of longer intervals (i.e., a Vierordt effect). This error reduction strategy is 
consistent with the general framework of Bayesian PEM and ‘distrusting the present’ 
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(Hohwy et al., 2016).  The present authors have looked at this process in more detail 
in another paper (Kent, Klein, & Van Doorn, in preparation).  
Briefly, however, the fact that hopelessness reduces overall error shows that 
expectations for the future affect Bayesian PEM in a systematic way. Whereas 
autonomic arousal and the salience network control the speed of a clock-like 
mechanism (Craig, 2009a; 2009b), and memory components of the central executive 
network calibrate the clock’s function according to prior experience (Shi et al., 2013), 
the current study suggests that hopelessness affects the decision stage of interval 
timing, perhaps via the default mode network and temporal awareness (Kent, 2018; 
Lloyd, 2012; van Wassenhove at al., 2011). The implication for ‘distrusting the 
present’ is that hopelessness affects the loss function’s role in determining the relative 
success or failure of the current predictive inferences, h0.  
The current study also suggests that a relative difference equation is common 
to psychological and physical formulations of time, common measures of time 
judgement error, and, as shown in Appendix A, psychophysical functions of time 
judgement and the Vierordt effect (Lejeune & Wearden, 2009). While it is premature 
to draw firm conclusions, the current study adds support to Buhusi and Meck’s (2009) 
claim that time perception is analogous to theories of physical time (i.e., relativity 
theory).  
 
4.1 Limitations of the current study 
 
Running head: HOPELESSNESS, TIME PERCEPTION AND RELATIVITY 
28 
Further research is needed to address the limitations of the current study by 
utilising a larger sample and possibly repeating the same intervals on different 
occasions in order to substantiate the Bayes factor evidence for the relative difference 
model. A larger sample should also include symptoms of severe depression besides 
hopelessness (e.g., anhedonia, psychomotor retardation) to probe how they interact 
with Bayesian hierarchical PEM. Testing hopelessness as an independent variable 
prior to interval productions would also avoid the need to control for random 
experimental changes in hopelessness and Bayesian PEM strategies such as Vierordt 
effects. Direct measurement of breathing rate would also be preferable to indirect 
HRV measures such as the LF:HF ratio.  
 
4.2 Conclusion 
In summary, evidence has been put forward in support of an association 
between symptoms of depression, time perception, and Bayesian PEM using a 
framework called “distrusting the present” (Hohwy et al., 2016). It was shown how 
key variables, namely autonomic arousal and hopelessness, have a combined effect on 
how individuals judged and experience time. Conversely, a key variable of time 
perception, namely interval duration, was also shown to affect how hopeful 
individuals were about the future. These findings suggest new ways of interpreting the 
vast literature on time perception in depressive states. 
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Appendix A 
 
Supplementary Analysis of Central Tendency Effects.  
 
It was expected that a Vierordt-like central tendency effect (Lejeune & 
Wearden, 2009; Shi et al., 2013) would become evident in order for individuals to 
reduce relative squared-error when the second interval production was longer than the 
first. This would be achieved by flattening the slope of production so that shorter 
intervals were overproduced and longer intervals were underproduced in a way 
similar to that reported by Thönes and Oberfeld (2015).  
Linear trendlines were fitted to participants’ raw productions of the second 
interval onwards to reveal coefficient (i.e., slope or a), constant (i.e., y-intercept or b), 
and indifference interval statistics (i.e, ii). An indifference interval is an interpolated 
value at which production is hypothetically neither over- or under-produced (i.e., 
indifferent). Whereas a flattened slope represents a central tendency or Vierordt 
effect, the y-intercept represents the constant increase or decrease averaged across 
productions. If you add a constant to a linear function, all points along that function 
are raised. In this case, a higher (positive) y-intercept implies that all interval 
productions are lengthened independent of the slope (i.e., independent of whether the 
productions are generally long, short or a mix of long and short). Higher intercepts 
represent slower or longer productions generally, and lower intercepts represent faster 
or shorter productions. The slope of production is calculable from y-intercept and 
indifference interval statistics according to a relative difference equation: 
 
     ! = 1 −	 &''       (6) 
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Strong Bayesian evidence was found for a combined model predicting the slope of 
production for intervals two-to-six by hopelessness, age, breathing rate, and the y-
intercept of the slope of production, BF10 = 136.7, R2 = .30. Frequentist regression 
showed that hopelessness (β = -.29, p = .01), age (β = -.29, p = .01), breathing rate (β 
= -.27, p = .02) and y-intercept (β = -.36, p = .001) were significant predictors of the 
slope of production, R2 = .30, F(4, 66) = 6.51, p < .001. Although the assumption of 
multicollinearity (VIFs < 2) was not violated, standardised residuals were 
heteroscedastic (Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests, p < .05). However, 
regression results are robust to minor violations of homoscedasticity (Nimon, 2012).  
The slope of production was highly correlated with mean production error 
between intervals two and six, r = .88, p < .001, suggesting that individuals 
minimised average error from interval two onwards by reducing the slope of 
production in the context of higher hopelessness. The effect is also potentially a 
response to a longer second interval relative to the first and is related to slower time 
experience. These results suggest that Vierordt central tendency effects in response to 
a longer second production interval than first are recruited as a Bayesian PEM 
strategy that utilises prior distribution based on a moving average of intervals 
presented previously (Shi et al., 2013).  
